Showing posts with label corporate governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label corporate governance. Show all posts

Corpocracy: How CEOs and the Business Roundtable Hijacked the World's Greatest Wealth Machine -- And How to Get It Back Review

Corpocracy: How CEOs and the Business Roundtable Hijacked the World's Greatest Wealth Machine -- And How to Get It Back
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Corpocracy: How CEOs and the Business Roundtable Hijacked the World's Greatest Wealth Machine -- And How to Get It Back ReviewCorpocracy is an ugly word, not just because of its mixed roots, but because of the governance situation in the United States which it has been coined to describe. In this compelling book, Bob Monks has summarised the means by which American business interests have conspired to suborn the state. No-one else has his authority or breadth of experience in this field of corporate governance. A corporate lawyer and banker by calling, he headed the division in charge of ERISA in the political field and he helped launch Institutional Shareholder Services and LENS to prove that active investors create value. He has distilled his remarkable range of experience into a brief and highly readable polemic. In doing so, he argues that the balance of power between corporations, those who own their shares and those charged with regulating their conduct has to be redressed.
It might, at first sight, seem that the situation which he analyses so penetratingly is peculiar to the United States and that the wider world need not actively concern itself with the author's message. This would be to underestimate the importance of this book. The lessons to be drawn from the consequences of the rise of the political power of American business, which it chronicles, are universal. In addition, given the global reach of American corporations, the need to restore their accountability to their investors within an effective regulatory framework has global implications.
Corpocracy is not a lament, though it describes much that is lamentable. It is a sober and arresting account of the manner in which the author's personal efforts to persuade the appropriate authorities, regulators and major investing institutions to do their duty, morally and juridically, has met with little effective response. The book's impact is all the greater for the restrained manner in which Bob Monks describes how those appointed to discharge their statutory and fiduciary duties repeatedly failed to do so. Inaction by the gatekeepers, left the field open to the untrammelled rapacity of imperial CEOs.
The balance of power between boards and CEOs in the United States remains a paradox, given the country's regulatory history of preventing accretions of power in relation to trusts and to banking. Nowhere else would it be possible to elect a director on a single vote, nowhere else could shareholder votes be invalidated by "ballot stuffing", nowhere else are shareholders so limited in their ability to raise issues at AGMs, which some directors may not even bother to attend. The prevailing concept of CEO/chairmen selecting their outside board members, thus compromising their independence, strengthens the hand of the CEO at the expense of that of the board.
The response to this imbalance in governance terms is the financial track record of US corporations, but at whose expense has it been achieved? Bob Monks' answer is:
"History will look back on the 1990s and early 2000s as a time when the principal officers of public American corporations transferred from shareholders to themselves approximately $1 trillion - or 10 percent of the market value of public exchanges. This must be the largest peacetime movement of wealth ever recorded, and it was accomplished through stealth that amounted to theft and in a spirit of regulatory permissiveness that certainly rises near to the level of criminal neglect." In addition, there is the extra 5 percent of profitability that the Corporate Library metric tells us is lost through bad practice, plus the opportunity cost of boards focusing on short term personal aggrandisement at the expense of sustainable profitable growth. As the one member of the SEC, who opposed the Committee's recent decision to limit the ability of shareholders to put forward resolutions, said: "Corporate governance in the United States is not well served by inattentive boards that are effectively unaccountable to shareholders."
Inevitably one of the headline manifestations of this lack of accountability has been the grossness of the rewards, which some of these principal officers have arrogated to themselves, for failure as well as success. There are attempts to justify these excesses by analogy with the earnings of stars of sport, stage and screen or by claiming that they are market determined. The analogy with the stars is manifestly spurious. The stars earn what their individual talent commands in the hotly contested market for entertainment. The profits of a corporation are earned collectively and represent the sum of the efforts of everyone in an enterprise. The issue therefore is how they should be distributed in a form that would be generally perceived to be fair and in accordance with the concept of natural justice.
A corporation's pay structure should meet the test of equity, rewarding those working for it, from top to bottom, in relation to their contribution to its performance. Ignoring equity in rewards sows the seeds of social division and dissension with its longer term consequences. What seems to have set the bounds to the multiple by which the earnings of the principal officers of companies exceed those of the average employee in most countries is a sense of social cohesion. The multiple varies by country and through time, but it represents a social constraint or discipline, which carries with it economic advantages not to be ignored.
The fact that shareholders are outraged by the grosser excesses of the pay packages of the principal officers of some corporations is no more than a symptom of the lack of accountability of US boards to those who own their stock, hence the theme of the book. It is a cause which Bob Monks has espoused and pursued with a determination and energy that is wholly admirable and selfless. In spite of setbacks, he believes that this essential accountability can be restored. He sees no cause for new laws, agencies or fiscal measures, though the existing statutory and regulatory framework should be effectively enforced. He argues that it is the major investing institutions that carry the obligation to themselves and to society to restore trust in the capitalistic system.
They have the power to reform the governance of corporations and they have a straightforward economic incentive to do so. The obligation, however, of the great foundations, among the investing institutions, to play their part in bringing about reform goes beyond the calculus of financial gain. It lies at the heart of their creation. They directly assist their chosen causes, but that is within the wider context of a market system which provides them with the ability to do this. They have a responsibility to maintain the means by which they fulfil the aims for which they were founded.
The book's message is therefore optimistic, provided that it is heeded in time. Trust and accountability can be restored, but it will take courage and above all leadership to do so. What is needed is enlightened leadership by those in a position to exercise it in the investing institutions and in corporations themselves. In Bob Monks' words:
"It demands that those with a majority stake in the corpocracy - its principal owners and beneficiaries - lead the way back to the broad light of day. The hour is late. The sun won't always be waiting."
Read Corpocracy and judge for yourself!Corpocracy: How CEOs and the Business Roundtable Hijacked the World's Greatest Wealth Machine -- And How to Get It Back Overview

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Watching the Watchers: Corporate Goverance for the 21st Century Review

Watching the Watchers: Corporate Goverance for the 21st Century
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Watching the Watchers: Corporate Goverance for the 21st Century ReviewMonks and Minow update and expand on their previous books Power and Accountabilityand Corporate Governance. As practitioners and theorists they providedozens of examples from personal experience which enable the reader to quickly grasp the importance of corporate governance to wealth creation and social progress. In a few short hours of reading they cover the evolution of the corporation as a social construct, as well as the developing roles of shareholders, directors, and management. The book concludes with concrete recommendations which deserve thoughtful consideration.
Monks and Minow trace the evolution of corporate governance and note that "there was no conscious choice in favor of treating shares of stock as though they were betting slips for races that were over at the end of each day." "Every 'improvement' in the system for owning stock was designed to make it easier to trade. No one seemed to notice or care that each of these 'improvements' also made it harder to exercise classic ownership rights." "During the takeover era, it became clear that, though the system was designed to promote transferability above all, there was one kind of transfer that the system would not tolerate: the transfer of power from one group to another."
Monks and Minow are concerned with increasing corporate accountability. They argue that any attempt to do so through chartering restraints is doomed to failure because the company's managers can move virtually any place in the world. In addition, "the political process is too dependent on money to make it possible for the government to be the ultimate guardian of accountability." "The only answer is a system of governance that originates from within the corporation itself and that includes the participation of an informed and effectively manifested broad class of owners." They point out that the tax cost of pensions is in excess of $50 billion per year, the largest item in the budget after defense. Because pension funds are subsidized by public funds it is, therefore, "appropriate for government to define broadly how pension fund trustees should function in their capacity as owners of the country's industrial establishment."
They call for a "Federal Law of Ownership" to coordinate the action of relevant agencies. For example, "the government must set the standard for interpreting and enforcing the 'exclusive benefit' rule or ERISA to provide guidance for private sector fiduciaries." However, the prime responsibility falls not to government but to the pension funds and corporations.
In the end, "whether ERISA trustees will ultimately become effective monitors depends on two factors - DOL's willingness and capacity to enforce its regulation and, more importantly, the conclusion by corporate management that an ownership-based governance system is ultimately in their best interest." Government needs to draw a "bright line" on conflict of interest; management needs to acknowledge that "creative tension" between themselves and owners is preferable to the current system of unaccountable "phony governance." Pension funds would then create a market for new institutions offering "ownership services" and companies with effective governance performance would realize the benefit of lower capital costs.
reviewed by James McRitchie, editor of the Corporate Governance site at
http:/www.wp.com/CORPGOVWatching the Watchers: Corporate Goverance for the 21st Century Overview

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Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International Research and Practice (New Horizons in Management) Review

Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International Research and Practice (New Horizons in Management)
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Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International Research and Practice (New Horizons in Management) ReviewPresents an excellent set of worldwide research on progress, strategies, results, and challenges.
Overall, progress seems to be glacial but more pronounced in European countries, such as Norway with legislated quotas. Women's representation appears associated with representation in senior management, smaller pay gaps, equity legislation, work-family initiatives, social/cultural support, quality of board deliberations, and increased profit. Of course, if the correlation with increased profit proves strong enough, we may see growing demand for the Pax World Women's Equity Fund and others that promote gender equity. So far, correlations seem too weak, although several public pension funds, including CalPERS and CalSTRS may help the cause.
One of the more interesting papers in this collection is that of Val Singh, who focuses on Jordan and Tunisia. I haven't seen much research on corporate governance in Arab countries, especially focused on women, and was surprised to learn 10% of Tunisian directors are women. It is difficult enough trying to get inside the "black box" of boardrooms anywhere. Creating benchmark studies in Arab countries must be even more difficult, given what at least appears to this outsider as a general reluctance to tackle gender issues.
Women do much better at state-run businesses. In the US, we seem to be more willing to experiment at companies that are broken, so the financial crisis may present an opportunity. However, several researchers warn of a "glass cliff." Apparently, women are invited onto more boards where companies are failing and are desperate. They are paid less at companies performing well and more at those doing poorly. Like directors elected by dissident shareowners, women directors are often isolated as outsiders and do better when they are not alone.
At the February 2009 "Women in Investments" conference in Sacramento, CalSTRS board member Carolyn Widener, drew a big laugh when she quoted Nicholas Kristof about speculation at Davos, Switzerland concerning "whether we would be in the same mess today if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters." Eventually, if resurrected, maybe we'll have Lehman Sisters and Brothers. This volume contains some of the best research to date from a wide variety of disciplines around the world that may just help to get us there.Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International Research and Practice (New Horizons in Management) Overview

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Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance: It Can't Happen to Us--Avoiding Corporate Disaster While Driving Success (Wiley Corporate F&A) Review

Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance: It Can't Happen to Us--Avoiding Corporate Disaster While Driving Success (Wiley Corporate FandA)
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Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance: It Can't Happen to Us--Avoiding Corporate Disaster While Driving Success (Wiley Corporate F&A) ReviewThe elements of strong corporate governance are lucidly explained by author Rick Steinberg with the right balance between conceptual and practical. Too often books in this field are so conceptual as to be close to useless, or so academic as to bear little relation to the complexities of a fast moving real-life corporation. It also indicates an understanding of the costs and effort to get it right, the tradeoffs that must be made, and the scarcity of executive and Board time and comprehension, of complex fast-moving corporate entities. The inclusion of analysis of some of the current controverisies over Board practices--BP and HP for example--render it more alive and timely than many more stultifying entries. As a Chairman or CEO for over 25 years, I can appreciate the scope and practicality of this guide.Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance: It Can't Happen to Us--Avoiding Corporate Disaster While Driving Success (Wiley Corporate F&A) Overview

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Inside the Boardroom: How Boards Really Work and the Coming Revolution in Corporate Governance Review

Inside the Boardroom: How Boards Really Work and the Coming Revolution in Corporate Governance
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Inside the Boardroom: How Boards Really Work and the Coming Revolution in Corporate Governance ReviewThe book covers the big picture but delves deeply into a very broad range of special topics concerning board structure, roles, best practices, effective functioning, board member types, and approaches and techniques for building a better board.
What distinguishes this work is that it is based on the study of boards of directors of 29 private, for-profit, 4 government owned, and 6 not-for-profit organizations. Moreover, it provides many features, in addition to insightful discussion, such as: a model job description for the board chair; a Director Competency Matrix Analysis used to recruit board members; 15 questions to assess whether a board is effective at strategy development, and many other highly practical tables, examples, and methods.
This is an outstanding work that will be of value to board members, directors, and executives, as well as students and researchers. Very highly recommended.Inside the Boardroom: How Boards Really Work and the Coming Revolution in Corporate Governance Overview

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Executive Compensation Best Practices (Wiley Best Practices) Review

Executive Compensation Best Practices (Wiley Best Practices)
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Executive Compensation Best Practices (Wiley Best Practices) ReviewOverall, this book provides a solid overview of a range of executive compensation practices. The section on proxy statement disclosures was particularly helpful because it provides a number of specific examples from proxy statements issued after the new SEC rules took effect.
Other sections are not as strong. I suspect that the book is best suited for junior level advisors to Compensation Committees (such as junior level compensation consultants or law firm associates), rather than the committee members themselves. For more senior professionals and committee members, the book may provide some helpful reminders. Still, the price is moderate enough to justify purchasing it, particularly if the proxy statement disclosure section will be of interest.Executive Compensation Best Practices (Wiley Best Practices) Overview

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Power and Accountability: Restoring the Balances of Power Between Corporations and Society Review

Power and Accountability: Restoring the Balances of Power Between Corporations and Society
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Power and Accountability: Restoring the Balances of Power Between Corporations and Society Review"Power & Accountability" contends that institutional investors are changing U.S. corporate governance for the better, and that the law should encourage those changes. In my view, the thesis is both positively and normatively flawed.
The empirical evidence on institutional investor activism is mixed, at best. There is some anecdotal evidence that institutions are becoming more active, using the proxy system to defend their interests. Less visibly, institutions supposedly influence business policy and board composition through negotiations with management. Yet, there is little concrete evidence that shareholder activism matters. Even the most active institutions spend trifling amounts on corporate governance. Institutions devote little effort to monitoring management. They rarely conduct proxy solicitations or put forward shareholder proposals. They do not to try to elect representatives to boards of directors.
Even if institutional investor activism matters, it is not clear that it should be encouraged. U.S. public corporations are characterized by a separation of ownership and control: the firm's nominal owners, the shareholders, exercise virtually no control over either day to day operations or long-term policy. Instead, control is vested in the hands of professional managers, who typically own only a small portion of the firm's shares. This separation is carved into stone by U.S. corporate law-under all corporation statutes, the key players in the formal decision making structure are the members of the board of directors. The separation of ownership and control has costs, the most significant of which are referred to as agency costs, incurred to prevent shirking by managers. The agency cost model forces one to confront the question: who will monitor the monitors? In any team organization, one must have some ultimate monitor who has sufficient incentives to ensure firm productivity without himself having to be monitored. Otherwise, one ends up with a never ending series of monitors monitoring lower level monitors. Institutional investors, at least potentially, may behave quite differently than dispersed individual investors. Because they own large blocks, and have an incentive to develop specialized expertise in making and monitoring investments, they could play a far more active role in corporate governance than dispersed shareholders. Institutional investors holding large blocks have more power to hold management accountable for actions that do not promote shareholder welfare. Their greater access to firm information, coupled with their concentrated voting power, will enable them to more actively monitor the firm's performance and to make changes in the board's composition when performance lagged. As a result, concentrated ownership in the hands of institutional investors might lead to a reduction in agency costs.
The benefits of institutional control, however, may come at too high a cost. There is good evidence that bank control of the securities markets has harmed that Japanese and German economies by impeding the development of new businesses. More importantly, there is a risk that institutional investors will abuse their control by self-dealing and other forms of over-reaching. If management becomes more beholden to the interests of large shareholders, it may become less concerned with the welfare of smaller investors. The U.S. experience with social investing by public pension funds, moreover, suggests that politicization of stockownership will be an economic drag. In general, the greater the extent to which a public pension fund is subject to direct political control, the worse its investment returns.
In my view, moreover, the separation of ownership and control is a highly efficient solution to the decisionmaking problems faced by large corporations. Separating ownership and control by vesting decisionmaking authority in a centralized entity distinct from the shareholders is what makes the large public corporation feasible. To be sure, this separation results in the agency cost problem described above. A narrow focus on agency costs, however, easily can distort one's understanding. Corporate managers operate within a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms that substitute for monitoring by residual claimants. Important constraints are provided by a variety of market forces. The capital and product markets, the internal and external employment markets, and the market for corporate control all constrain shirking by firm agents. In addition, the legal system evolved various adaptive responses to the ineffectiveness of shareholder monitoring, establishing alternative accountability structures to punish and deter wrongdoing by firm agents, such as the board of directors.
An even more important consideration, however, is that agency costs are the inevitable consequence of vesting discretion in someone other than the residual claimant. We could substantially reduce, if not eliminate, agency costs by eliminating discretion; that we do not do so suggests that discretion has substantial virtues. A complete theory of the firm thus requires one to balance the virtues of discretion against the need to require that discretion be used responsibly. Neither discretion nor accountability can be ignored, because both promote values essential to the survival of business organizations. Unfortunately, they are ultimately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less of the other. The power to hold to account is ultimately the power to decide. Managers cannot be made more accountable without undermining their discretionary authority.
The root economic argument against shareholder activism thus becomes apparent. Large-scale institutional involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the modern public corporation practicable; namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. Given the significant virtues of discretion, one ought not lightly interfere with management or the board's decisionmaking authority in the name of accountability. Preservation of managerial discretion should always be the null hypothesis. The separation of ownership and control mandated by U.S. corporate law has precisely that effect.Power and Accountability: Restoring the Balances of Power Between Corporations and Society Overview

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Taking Liberties: Four Decades In The Struggle For Rights Review

Taking Liberties: Four Decades In The Struggle For Rights
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Taking Liberties: Four Decades In The Struggle For Rights ReviewA bunch of books in one as we see the turbulent litigation of the 60s and 70s from an insider's point of view, then the growth of Human Rights Watch and the important work done in Central America and elsewhere to George Soros' occasionally transformational efforts in former Soviet countries. Refreshingly honest, such as the part where Neier admits that the ACLU's mental health litigation asking for the mentally ill to be released from institutions unwittingly contributed to the homeless crises which continues to this day. I have never heard a liberal admit this, though it is probably true (it's important to admit mistakes to avoid them in the future). The book would have been better with more about Neier's personal life and his personal feelings about triumphs and defeats, but all in all a great insider view of civil liberties litigation, NGO politics, and human rights strategy.Taking Liberties: Four Decades In The Struggle For Rights Overview

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Mergers and Acquisitions Security: Corporate Restructuring and Security Management Review

Mergers and Acquisitions Security: Corporate Restructuring and Security Management
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Mergers and Acquisitions Security: Corporate Restructuring and Security Management ReviewTo contemporary security and executive managers faced with rapid change in technology, intricate and sophisticated methods of theft, fraud, and manipulation of corporate assets, and insidious transfer of trade secrets, this book provides timely and functional guidelines and procedures necessary to successfully accomplish their responsibilities as members of the merger and acquisition team during all stages of corporate mergers and acquisition. It provides an in depth insight to security problems, presents checklists and forms to perform analysis of potential risks, and affords practical methods to forecast and minimize loss. It is an outstanding and must read book for those involved in or interested in modern corporate security.Mergers and Acquisitions Security: Corporate Restructuring and Security Management Overview

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